“No reservation over nuclear deal” says South Korean Foreign Minister

Excerpts from an interview of Song Min-soon, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Korea by P.S. Suryanarayana appeared on The Hindu 21st September 2007.


India-Republic of Korea relations are becoming very broad-based. One of the issues now in focus is India’s request for RoK’s support in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Will this be a defining issue in India-RoK relations?

You are posing a very sensitive issue, and you are bringing me to the corner of a defining moment (laughs heartily). We fully understand India’s need for peaceful use of nuclear energy. At the same time, India has a great responsibility — as a great country, as the largest democracy in the world — for strengthening the global non-proliferation regime.

We have [placed] great reliability and credibility on India’s sound discretion and its sense of responsibility in the international community. On the other hand, as far as the Republic of Korea is concerned, we are in a unique position. One, we are the sixth largest nuclear-energy country in the world. And, at the same time, we are now … making a de-nuclearised Korean peninsula. We, as a key member of the six-party talks, are ardently pursuing the goal of de-nuclearising the peninsula. So we are sensitive to any development that may give any unintended impact on our efforts for de-nuclearising the Korean peninsula. With that in mind, while fully understanding India’s need for peaceful use of nuclear energy and its commitment for strengthening the non-proliferation regime, we will take our position in the NSG. So [too] the others.

As of now, RoK has not made up its mind about whether or not to support India in the NSG?

I cannot go further to take our position in public. Also, we support India’s endeavour, India’s position, to galvanise, to strengthen the global non-proliferation regime.

Do you want India to do anything more than signing this 123 Agreement with the U.S. — which has a non-proliferation component, as seen by the U.S. — in order to gain support in the NSG?

I am not telling that we do have some reservation in taking our position vis-À-vis this India-United States deal. What I am saying is that because of our unique position in which Korea is, we cannot make our position in public. I think, that says enough (smiles).

You are convinced that India is a responsible power for non-proliferation globally...

Yes, yes. I think, India will continue to behave as a responsible member of the international community, which needs to strengthen your non-proliferation regime.

But you are not asking India to join the NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty)?

It is up to India’s discretion.

RoK will be satisfied if India promotes non-proliferation even without joining the NPT…

Actually, that cannot be decided by RoK alone. We are somewhat composed [about] seeing the future developments of India’s policy, India’s course. Because India is increasingly becoming an important player, [a] member of the international community. That says everything that I can. You are very much (laughs heartily) [questioning] me.

Australia, for instance, wants India to sign a [bilateral] nuclear safeguards agreement [for receiving its uranium]. Does RoK want India to enter into an RoK-India nuclear safeguards agreement to get NSG-related support?

We will see. We will see this issue.

With RoK playing an important role, India has recently joined the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) project related to fusion technology. What, in your assessment, is the value-add that India brings?

Korea believes that India will be complementary to other member-countries [the U.S., Canada, the European Union, China, Japan, and RoK], as India is recognised as having a competitive edge in the science and technology sector. India’s participation is significant because the ITER project is a joint effort to ensure the peaceful use of nuclear energy while also conforming to an international non-proliferation regime.

India played a role under U.N. auspices on the Korean peninsula in the 1950s. Do you foresee a role now for India in the final settlement of the Korean reunification issue or the North Korean nuclear arms question, or both, or none?

India enjoys a special status with the two Koreas. By making use of this special status, we hope India will provide North Korea with the appropriate advice, so that North Korea will be able to actively participate in the international community through the reform and opening up of its society. Our Government would greatly appreciate the support of India with regard to the six-party talks [on the de-nuclearisation of the Korean peninsula].

Does RoK feel left out of the Japanese proposal of a quadrilateral forum of Asia-Pacific democracies — the U.S., India, Japan, and Australia? Alternatively, does RoK see the planned forum as a provocative gesture towards China, or indeed a polite political attempt at marginalising Seoul?

The concerned parties have repeatedly expressed their position on the implications of the China factor. My Government believes that the initiative [for this quadrilateral forum] is not a geopolitical bloc against any particular third country.

Korea has built a democracy and a market economy that meet the highest global standards. And [Korea] has been exercising regional roles commensurate with its political status and economic capability. We do not see any reason for any particular country to attempt to marginalise Korea.

RoK is an active participant in the ‘Coffee Club’ of middle-power aspirants at the U.N. Does this cast a shadow over Korea’s bilateral exchanges with India?

We have been supporting the [formation of a] reformed Security Council that is more representative, democratic, transparent, and efficient. Any proposal on Security Council reform should be based on the widest possible political agreement of the U.N. member-states.

Would you describe Korea’s emerging equation with India in this broad context as a tension-free engagement? However, if any real concerns cloud the bilateral front, what is the way forward?

I do not see any real concerns that could cast a shadow on our bilateral relations. There are no disputes or security concerns between our two countries and no feeling of animosity between the two peoples. Our two countries are united by the shared values of democracy and market economy. There is, moreover, huge potential for mutually beneficial cooperation.

When do you realistically expect an RoK-India Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement to be signed? Does RoK have concerns about the investment climate in India for a long-term CEPA?

At this time, both sides are in the midst of what is normally the most challenging phase of CEPA negotiations: finalising the tariff offers for trade in goods and the concession list for trade in services. I am confident that the two sides will be able to finalise the negotiations by the end of this year.

While the difficulties encountered by [the Korean company] POSCO in its efforts to construct a state-of-the-art steel complex [in Orissa] do give rise to some concerns in the short term, in the long term Korea is quite confident about the direction of the Indian economy. I can tell you that Korea’s business sector foresees strong economic growth in India in the future and is committed to actively participating in the process.

Will China’s sensitivities condition RoK’s defence links with India?

ROK’s defence cooperation with India … gaining momentum … is not directed against any third country.

RoK and India are endeavouring to base bilateral defence ties on objective factors and mutual interest. Technology and market factors will govern the relations.

Korea is cooperating on the security and defence front with China. One notable example is the annual foreign policy and security dialogue. We believe that bilateral security cooperation of this kind will indeed serve to further strengthen regional security in East Asia.